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ThePolicy Reversal of 1956-1957
Only a few months after the selective restraints on housing credit had
become operative, governmental policies shifted toward efforts to cushion
the impact of tightening credit on the housing sector. Successive steps were
taken to help check the decline in the supply of funds available for home
building and purchase. First, the restrictions on borrowings from the Federal
Home Loan Banks were relaxed. Later, mortgage originators were given
easier access to the Federal National Mortgage Association, and mortgage
purchases under the secondary market program of the Association were
stepped up sharply. Finally, toward the end of 1956 and again in '957,
maximum interest rates were raised on FHA loans. Other measures acted
on the demand for housing credit rather than the supply. Among these were
the restoration of the maximum maturity of 30yearsfor FHA and V.A.
loans and the withdrawal of the, additional 2percent down payment re-
quired under regulation for FHA home loans (while the 2 per cent minimum
down payment for veterans' home loans was retained until April 1958). In
addition, administration-sponsored legislation adopted in August 1957further
reduced the minimum down-payment requirements for FHA home loans.
These and other actions reversing the ipolicies of restraint were taken
over a two-year period beginning in late z 955, during most of which there
were strong demands for funds in the capital markets generally and con-
tinued restrictive measures of the monetary authorities. They merged finally
into actions to stimulate residential Construction lfl order to combat the
recession that began in the latter part of 1957.Atabout the same time, the
policy of general credit restraint was modified.
The rate of housing starts had dropped from milliondwelling units
in early 1955 to less than 1.2millionby the end of the year; it continued
to fall in 1956 and by early 1957haddeclined to a little over 930,000unitS.
After a minor recovery in the spring and summer of 1957,it resumedits
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downward movement until a trough of 915,000 units was reached in Febru-
ary 1958 (Table 6). Construction expenditures on new dwelling units de-
dined more moderately, from an annual rate of $15.2billionin the summer
of 7955 to a little over $72 billion in the spring of '957, since higher build-
ing costs and the tendency to provide somewhat larger and better equipped
homes cushioned the effects of the sharp fall in the number of new units
started. Gross and net mortgage credit extensions for housing also receded
from the high levels of 1955 (Tables g and 3). Because of time lags, how-
ever, their decline did not reflect the full impact of tightening credit on the
housing sector and particularly on builders. Forward commitments for
residential lending dropped much more sharply than final mortgage loans.
New commitments by life insurance companies, for example, fell by 46 per
cent between the last quarter of 1954 and the last quarter of 7956, and
reached still lower levels in 1957. Their outstanding commitments in the
spring of 7957 were only half the amount of outstandings in late 7954
(Chart i and Table 24). The volume of outstanding commitments on gov-
ernment-underwritten mortgage loans by New York savings banks between
September 7955 and September 7957 declined by nearly 6o per cent (Table
8). Reflecting the general rise in interest rates, average yields on FHA home
loans purchased in the secondary market, which had already increased mod-
erately in 1955 and the first half of 1956, moved up at an accelerated rate
thereafter and in late 1957 were almost 7.5 per cent higher than in late 7954
(Chart 2 and Table 25). The reduced availability of funds manifested itself
chiefly in the government-underwritten segment of the housing market, and
the drop in housing starts occurred solely in that segment.
Thus, residential building and mortgage lending were shrinking in the
midst of the continued, though at times slowed, general economic expansion
through mid-1957. It was under these conditions that the specific housing
credit policies of the federal government shifted in the direction of relaxation
and relief.
The Record of Actions
The first relaxation of the irestraints occurred in December of that
year. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board allowed members of the bank
system to obtain new nonemergency borrowings up to 5 per cent of their
savings capital as long as the outstanding borrowings of the member institu-
tion did not exceed io per Cent of its capitaU This relaxation went only a
small part of the way toward restoring the borrowing privileges existing
before the fall of 7955.
In January 7956, the FHA and V.A. restored the 30-year maximum
maturity of home loans, which had been reduced to 25 years six months
'Press release of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, December 73, 1955.
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earlier.2At the same time, the Federal National Mortgage Association
adopted a "mortgage purchase option plan" designed to help lenders obtain
temporary funds for new lending activity without permanent sale of mort-
gages in an unfavorable market. Under the plan, sellers of mortgage loans
to FNMA could repurchase them, for a fee, within nine months at the same
price at which they had been sold. This program was akin to the "mortgage
warehousing" arrangements which had become increasingly difficult to
obtain, but its volume remained quite small.8
In April 1956 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board again relaxed its
earlier restrictions on nonemergency advances by allowing all members to
borrow up to io per cent of their savings capital. This figure was raised to
12.5 per cent in September, and another 2.5 per cent was added in 1957 for
cases of "undue hardship."'
InAugust, the Federal National Mortgage Association put into immediate
effect two liberalizing provisions of the Housing Act of 1956 which had
been enacted by Congress early that month.5 One was its new authority to
reduce the amount of the Association's stock that sellers of mortgages to
FNMA under its secondary market program were required to buy. The stock
purchase requirement, introduced in 1954 both to make sales to FNMA less
attractive and to effect a gradual transfer of stock ownership to private
hands, had been set by law at 3 per cent of the amount of loans sold. To-
gether with FNMA's fees, it acted as an effective penalty for selling mort-
gages to the Association, particularly since FNMA common stock, a new
security acquired involuntarily by mortgage originators who generally were
not interested in holding it as an investment, was traded at large discounts
from par. There was powerful agitation for reducing the required percentage
permanently, and the administration was eager to improve access to the
Association temporarily. The was an amendment which gave FNMA
administrative discretion in establishing the required stock subscription, pro-
vided it was not less than i per cent of the amount of mortgages sold. This
gave the government another flexible tool for influencing the supply of
mortgage funds; and itis perhaps significant that the administration's
request for the amendment appeared in a section of the President's Economic
Report of January 1956 entitled "Increasing the Stability of our Expanding
'Press release of the Veterans Administration, January 17,1956,making a joint
announcement for both FHA and V.A.
'ioth Annual Report, Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1956, p. 217.
Letter from the Office of Director, Division of FHLB Operations, to the Federal
Home Loan Bank Presidents, dated April 4, 1956. Statement on Housing Credit, a
press release of the White House dated September 20,1956.Report of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board for the year ending December 31, 1957, p. 20.
'PublicLaw 1020, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, approved August 7, 1956.
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Economy," which also included a proposal to study the desirability of
stand-by power to control consumer instalment credit. Immediately upon
enactment of the amendment, the minimum stock subscription was reduced
from 3 to 2 per cent.6 The effect was to raise the seller's cash proceeds from
the transaction, i.e. to make sale of mortgages to FNMA less costly.
The other provision of the Housing Act of i 956, which was not sought
by the administration, allowed the Federal National Mortgage Association
to issue forward commitments for secondary market purchases. Similar
authority had existed during earlier periods and had at times converted
FNMA from a secondary market facility to a primary lender, since, mortgage
originators made loans not only with the intention of offering them to the
Association but also with the assurance that FNMA would buy them. The
reorganization of the agency in 1954 was intended to abolish this practice,
except for the limited "special assistance" programs. In 1956, however, the
Congress was so impressed by the current difficulties of builders in obtaining
advance commitments from private lenders that it re-established FNMA's
commitment authority for secondary market purchases "at prices which are
sufficient to facilitate advance planning of home construction, but which
are sufficiently below the price then offered by the Association for immediate
purchase to prevent excessive sales to the Association. ..."
TheHousing Act of 1956 included other liberalizing measures. The mini-
mum down-payment requirements on existing homes bought with FHA loans
were reduced to match those for new homes. By facilitating the sale of old
houses by owners seeking new ones, this amendment could be expected to
provide a mild tonic for residential building. In addition, the act raised the
maximum mortgage amounts and mortgage loan ratios for multi-family
projects financed with FHA loans. This measure, together with other amend-
ments and a more liberal administration of the FHA rental housing program
as the agency recovered from the shock of the "scandals" uncovered in i
in connection with the earlier Section 6o8 rental program, contributed to
a marked recovery of rental housing in 1957.8
Further credit relaxations were announced in September i 956. The Fed-
eral National Mortgage Association reduced the stock purchase subscription
again from 2 to i per cent of the amount of mortgages sold to it. Simul-
taneously, the purchase price for advance commitments on 4.5 per cent
ioth Annual Report, Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1956,p.213.
'PublicLaw Sec. 204(a).
The number of dwelling units started in privately financed multi-family structures
in 1957 was i19,300 asagainst 82,300 in 1956, while privately financed starts of units
in r- and 2-family structures declined from z,or r,6oo in 1956 to 871,800 in 1957
(Housing Statistics, April 1958, p. 6). The number of units in multi-family projects
started under the FHA program rose from 5,991in1956 to 18,297 in 1957(ibid.,
p. io).
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mortgageswas raised from 92 to 94,9 bringing it closer to the current price
in the private market. And the Federal Housing Administration revoked the
2 per cent increase in minimum down payments for houses appraised at
$9,000 or less, while maintaining it for houses appraised in excess of this
amount, which represented the bulk of the market.1°
a result of the measures to ease access to FNMA and because of the
increasing difficulties in placing government-underwritten loans in the private
market, mortgage sales to the Association rose sharply in the fall of 1956
(Table i i). Continued purchases at the current rate would possibly have
exhausted the available funds before the Congress, then in recess, could
raise FNMA's authorization for secondary market operations. Consequently,
the Association was soon forced to retreat part of the way. In late November,
purchases were limited to mortgages which were originated not more than
four months before offering them to FNMA. This rule was designed to con-
centrate FNMA's support for new lending and new construction and to
minimize "dumping" of existing mortgage portfolios, and it resumed a prac-
tice adopted on earlier occasions to conserve funds. In December, the Asso-
ciation's purchase prices on forward commitments were lowered. In January
1957 the minimum stock purchase requirement was raised from i to 2 per
cent of the amount of mortgages sold to FNMA, and purchase prices for
loans offered for immediate delivery were reduced so as to adjust them more
closely to those prevailing in the private secondary mortgage market.lt
In December 1956, the Federal Housing Administration increased the
maximum interest rate on home loans from 4.5 to 5 per cent and the rates
on other residential mortgages to the extent that the agency had discretion-
ary power to do so.12 Since about mid-year, the maximum rate of 4.5 per
cent on FHA and V.A. mortgages had begun to act as a special restraint
on the flow of funds into the government-assisted housing sector as interest
rates generally continued to rise. Discounts in the secondary market on 4.5
per cent loans were increasing at an accelerated rate. Yet, for reasons dis-
cussed in Appendix A, even the higher discounts failed to prevent a sharp
fall in investment in government-underwritten mortgages and home build-
ing under the government programs. In view of the legislative ceiling of
4.5 per cent on the interest rate for veterans' home loans, administrative
discretion in raising the rate was limited to the FHA program where current
maximum rates prescribed by regulation were below the ceilings set by law.
The December i 956 increase in FHA rates was followed in January by an
xoth Annual Report, Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1956, pp. 213-215.
10 Statementon Housing Credit, White House press release of September 20, 1956.
zoth Annual Report, Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1956,pp.213 and 215.
lilbid.,pp. 41-43.
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•administration request that Congress raise the ceiling on interest rates for
veterans' home loans.'3
Late in March 1957,theFHA revoked the additional 2 per cent down-
payment requirement, which had been lifted earlier for low-priced homes,
for houses in all price classes.14 This action followed the administration's
even more far-reaching request that Congress liberalize the legal down-
payment requirements for homes bought with FHA mortgages so as to
"ease the adjustments in home building and financing that are likely to
accompany the expiration. .[ofthe V.A. loan program for veterans of
World War II, then scheduled for July 1958]..andto unify the mortgage
insurance facilities available to veterans and nonveterans." 15Obviously,any
reduction of the legal FHA down-payment minima was predicated upon
using first the minima then allowed, which had been raised by administrative
action in July 1955.
In August, the lower FHA down-payment requirements authorized in
the Housing Act of 1957 16weremade immediately effective. As shown in
Table i6, the reductions in minimum down payments were substantial. For
a house valued at $15,000, for example, only $1,050, or 7 per cent of the
appraised value, was required as against $2,ooo, or 13 per cent of value,
before the revision. Simultaneously with this action which tended to raise
the demand for funds, the maximum interest rate on FHA loans was in-
creased again from 5 to 5.25 per cent.17 The increase adjusted the rate to
the further rise in the general level of interest rates since December 1956,
when the FHA maximum had been raised from 4.5 to 5 per cent, and it
could be expected to help stimulate the flow of funds into FHA-insured
mortgages.
The Housing Act of 1957, by authorizing a $65 million increase in the
Treasury subscription to FNMA stock, also enlarged the capacity of the
Federal National Mortgage Association for purchase of government-under-
written mortgage loans in the secondary market. The Association's borrow-
ing capacity in the private market was augmented by ten times this amount,
and the "backstop" credit line of FNMA with the Treasury was increased.
The stimulative effects of the Housing Act of weredulled, however,
by its mandate to both FHA and V.A. to place regulatory limits on mortgage
loan discounts (see Appendix A). While the maximum discounts prescribed
by the agencies were generally sufficient to maintain competitive yields on
18Economic Report of the President, January 1957, p.65.
"White House press release, dated March 29, 1957.
EconomicReport of the President, January 1957, p.66.
lepublicLaw 85-104, 85th Congress, ist Session, approved July 12, 1957.
Pressrelease of the Federal Housing Administration, dated August 7, 1957.
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TABLE 16
Illustrations of Minimum Down-Payment Requirements on New 1- and 2-Family
Homes Bought with FHA-Insured Loans, 1955-1958
After Under Under Under Removal of Regulation of . HousingAct Housing Act
FHA- July3O,1955b" ' of1957a of April 1958'
Appraised
Value
Per Per Per Per Dollars Dollars Dollars Dollars Centf Centf Centf Cent'
$ 9,000 650 7.2 450 5.0 300 3.3 300 3.3
10,000 900 9.0 700 7.0 300 3.0 300 3.0
12,000 1,50012.51,20010.0 600 5.0 400 3.3
13,000 1,80013.81,50011.5 750 5.8 400 3.1
14,000 2,00014.31,700 12.1 900 6.4 500 3.6
15,000 2,30015.32,00013.31,050 7.0 650 4.3
16,000 2,60016.22,20013.71,200 7.5 800 5.0





a Loans insured under Section 203 of the National Housing Act, which comprises the
bulk of FHA loans. In administrative practice, the FHA adjusts the mortgage amounts
in multiples of $50 or $100 depending on the size of the mortgage, after being computed
from legal or regulatory provisions.
bThe regulation of July 30, 1955 raised the then existing legal requirements by 2 per
cent, from 5 per cent on the first $9,000 of house value to 7 per cent, and from 25 per
cent of the amount of value exceeding $9,000 to 27 per cent:
The regulation was withdrawn on September 20, 1 956, and this action restored the
legal minima given in footnote b.
d3per cent on the first $10,000 of house value, plus 15 per cent of the next $6,000, plus
30 per cent of the amount of value exceeding $16,000.
3 per cent on the first $13,500 of house value, plus 15 per cent of the next $2,500, plus
30 per cent of the amount exceeding $16,000.
Per cent of appraised value.
During the period under consideration, FHA home loans under Section 203 were sub-
ject to a maximum mortgage amount of $20,000.
the 5.25percent FHA loans, thiswasnot the case for the 4.5 per cent V.A.
loans. It was only after the repeal of discount controls in the Housing Act of
April 1958,18afteran increase of the maximum interest rate on V.A. loans
to 4.75 per cent in the same act, and after the new policy of credit ease
initiated in the fall of I957had penetrated into the mortgage market that
PublicLaw 85-364, 85th Congress, approved Aprili, 1958.
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the V.A. program began once more to be operative. But these efforts to
encourage residential building, as well as other i 958 legislative and admin-
istrative measures to mobilize the federal housing credit programs as bul-
warks against recession, are beyond the scope of this essay. It may merely be
noted that actions taken in 1958 removed some of the last remnants of the
credit restraints imposed in 1955.InJanuary 1958, the FHA withdrew the
requirement that loan closing costs be paid in cash by the borrower,19 and
in April the Veterans Administration eliminated the minimum down pay-
ment of 2percent, thus restoring the veterans' privilege of obtaining
V.A.-guaranteed loans without down payment.2°
Rationale of the Policy Shift
The reversal of the 1955 policies of credit restraint in the housing sector
can be largely attributed to three phenomena. One is partial correction
of most of the sector maladjustments that had been an important reason
for the selective restraints. The second is the disproportionately severe and
undesirable effect of prolonged credit restrictions on residential construction.
The third is the special and unintended impediment to home building and
home purchase that resulted from maintaining maximum interest rates on
government-underwritten loans, particularly veterans' home loans, below
competitive levels. Each of these points warrants more detailed examination.
Adjustments in the Housing and Mortgage Markets. Some of the excesses
associated with the housing boom of 1954hadbeen modified, if not cor-
rected, when the first relaxations of selective credit restraints occurred. At the
beginning of 1956, local housing market surpluses were reported to be fewer
than in the spring of 1955.21Theaverage vacancy ratio in FHA-flnanced
rental housing projects in March was 3.2 per cent as against 4.4 per cent a
year earlier; vacancy ratios exceeding 5 per cent were reported by only 22
field offices as against 38, and ratios of 10 per cent or more by only 6 offices
compared to 12inMarch 1955.Inthe nation as a whole, the vacant units
available for rent or sale in early 1956 represented a somewhat larger per-
centage of the housing inventory than in the year before (Table ibut
restoration of a greater vacancy reserve than in the early postwar years
was a desirable and anticipated result of the large amount of construction
of the several previous years and did not necessarily indicate general over-
building.
The extreme pressures on home builders to sell their current output,
Pressrelease of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA 58-2), dated January
9, 1958.
'°V.A.letter to lenders (Loan Guaranty Issue 58-138), dated April 7.
"Economic Report of the President, January 1956, p. 44. This statement was based
on reports of FHA and V.A. field offices initiated in 1955.
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TABLE17
Vacant Dwelling Units as a Percentage of All Dwelling Units, 1950, 1955-1957 a


















































































SOURCE: Housing Vacancies, BureaU of the Census, Series H-ill.
0Thecensus classification "dwelling units available for rent or sale" Omits vacant
"dilapidated" units, while the occupied housing inventory includes such units. Vacant
dilapidated units are offered in the market and therefore represent a portion of the ef-
fective market supply. For this reason as well as others, the level of the vacancy ratios
shown in the table probably understates the true level of vacancies. However, vacant
dilapidated units during the period covered showed no significant change, varying be-
tween 1.0 and 1.2 per cent of the housing inventory.
bWhereasthe "Per Cent Vacant" columns show the number of available vacant dwell-
ing units as a percentage of the number of all dwelling units, the rental vacancy rate gives
the vacant housing offered for rent as a percentage of the total rental housing stock, and
the home-owner vacancy rate gives the vacant housing offered for sale as a percentage of
the total supply of home-owner housing. See source for greater detail.
which were evident in their marketing practices the year before, had been
moderated. Shortages of building materials had been somewhat alleviated.22
While the mortgage market was still congested as a large volume of loans
went begging for purchase by permanent investors, the sharp decline in
forward commitments of major financial institutions (Tables 8 and 24)
indicated a better balance between the demand for mortgage loans and
the available supply of funds; "savings and loan associations had already
"Ibid.
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succeeded in bringing their commitments into reasonable adjustment with
their inflows of cash." 23Thetrend toward easier credit terms, exemplified
in the earlier rise of no-down-payment loans to veterans, had been halted.
To be sure, one manifestation of maladjustment—the increase in con-
struction costs—was continuing, but this movement was now associated with
the expansion of nonresidential construction and the general upward push
on prices at a time when demands on resources in the housing sector were
receding.
Progress toward correcting maladjustments in the housing sector, how-
ever, would at the most have warranted the removal of the selective re-
straints, that had been imposed earlier, not the positive aid offered to home
builders and home purchasers in i 956 and 1957. The rationale for positive
steps to bolster the housing sector must be sought elsewhere.
Disproportionate Effects of Tight Credit. The view that the credit con-
ditions of 1956 had a disproportionate impact on the housing market (as
well as on small business) is succinctly expressed in the President's Economic
Report of January i 957:
In the course of the year it became increasingly apparent that tighter credit
conditions affected unevenly different sectors of the economy and different
types of businesses. New and smaller business firms appeared to find it more
difficult to satisfy their financing requirements than established and larger con-
cerns. Also, the changes in the cost and availability of credit exerted especially
severe effects on home building. Consequently, the Administration took steps
to moderate the adverse impact of credit stringency in certain areas but sought
to do this without impairing the effectiveness of the general policy of credit
restraint.24
That genera! credit restraints are selective in their effects, even though
they are not intended to be, is widely understood. But it is much more
difficult to demonstrate and assess such differential effects in specific cases.
The concept of differential impacts is as yet poorly developed. There are
few if any relevant data for measuring the effects of changes in the avail-
ability of funds; and it is impossible to disassociate satisfactorily the results
of such changes from the many other forces operating simultaneously on
various economic activities. In the case of housing, two general criteria
may be used to illuminate the response of this sector to changes in the
availability of funds. One is the relative dependence of residential construc-
tion and real-estate activity on external funds. The other is the sensitivity
of the housing sector to changes in the cost of borrowing, defined broadly
to include noninterest cost and especially credit terms such as loan maturity
Ibid., p.46.
'Economic Report of the President, January1957,p.42.
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and down-payment requirement as well as the interest rate. Both criteria
show at least a strong presumption that tightening credit over time will
impinge with greater severity on housing than on business in general.
Other things being equal, an economic sector which is so organized that
its activity depends heavily on borrowings will be more adversely affected by
decreasing availability of credit than sectors less dependent on external
funds. The production and acquisition of residential real estate are unusually
dependent upon borrowed funds; and the forces behind this phenomenon
are so deeply embedded in our economic and institutional structure that
short-term economic stabilization policy must accept it as a fact of contem-
porary life, although the federal housing credit aids themselves may have
had a part in it over the longer run.25 According to estimates for the post-
war years through 1955, about 70 to 75 per cent of the funds used to
acquire new residential construction were borrowed. A similar proportion
probably holds for the purchase of existing homes.26 On the other hand,
only 35 per cent of the total funds used by corporations from 1948 to 1957
came from external sources.27 While similar data for unincorporated busi-
ness firms are not available, national income and expenditure estimates
confirm that aggregate business investment has been financed largely through
internal funds. Even in the period 1955-1957, for example, when business
borrowing was high, gross retained earnings of business accounted for about
two-thirds of gross private domestic investment.28 It is thus clear that home
building and home purchase are much more dependent on external funds
than is business investment. This is true also for capital expenditures by state
and municipal governments, but taxing powers in this case lend at least
potentially the kind of support to capital spending programs that privately
financed housing cannot command.
Activity in the housing sector is also more sensitive to changes in the cost
of borrowing than business investment generally. Business firms usually
borrow on the basis of expected profits which must be so high to compensate
For an analysis of the reasons for the great dependence of residential construction
and real-estate activity on external funds, cf. Miles L. Colean, American Housing,
Twentieth Century Fund, especiailyChapters 4 and 9.
For new construction, see Leo Grebler, David Blank, and Louis Winnick, Capital
Format ion in Residential Real Estate, Princeton for National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1956, Appendix M and Table 8o. As for the purchase of both existing and
new homes, a survey made in the fall of 1956 showed that 84 per cent of the home
owners who purchased their houses between January 1954andAugust 1956 had
incurred mortgage debt ("National Survey of Households," in Consumer Instalment
Credit, Federal Reserve Board, Part I, Vol. 2, Section IV, Table C-2). This per-
centage is consistent with similar figures reported for several postwar years in the
Consumer Finance Surveys.
Economic Report of the President, January 1958, Table F-59.
Ibid.,Table F-6.
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for uncertainty and risk that increases in the cost of borrowing within the
range prevailing in 1956-1957(or,for that matter, equivalent increases in
the real cost of using internal funds for expansion) are mild deterrents.
Moreover, the cost of money in most instances is a relatively minor item in
the total cost of doing business.29 In contrast, changes in the cost of bor-
rowing have a pronounced effect on the ability of consumers to invest in
homes. For one thing, the mortgage debt payment represents the over-
whelming proportion of the current housing expense of home owners using
mortgage loans. In the case of purchasers under the FHA program, for
example, the average share of mortgage payments in the "prospective hous-
ing expense" calculated by the Federal Housing Administration has been
more than three-fourths.80 Second, mortgage debt payments represent a
larger percentage of family income than debt payments do of the revenue
of most business firms—in the case of home purchasers under the FHA pro-
gram, typically about 15 per cent.3' While the sensitivity of housing demand
to changes in interest rates alone, within reasonable ranges of rates, may
not be great, its elasticity is considerable in respect to variations in down
payments and mortgage loan maturities combined.
Much more research needs to be done to measure the dependence of
various economic sectors on external funds and their sensitivity to changes
in the cost of borr6wing. Meanwhile, the above observations seem to warrant
the conclusion that tightening credit has a sharply disproportionate impact
on the housing sector. Because of time lags, this effect was not immediately
discernible in the net flow of residential mortgage funds relative to the total
flow of capital funds, for the amount of funds going into the housing sector
during 1956 still reflected partly the large volume of earlier financing com-
mitments that had "come home to roost." In 1957, however, the mortgage
market apparently absorbed a markedly smaller proportion of total funds
High income taxes are also sometimes adduced as a reason for low sensitivity of
business investment to rising cost of borrowed funds. See, for example, Arthur F.
Burns, Prosperity without Inflation, Fordham, 1957, pp. 46-47. However, this reason-
ing raises the difficult point of tax incidence. Also, in light of the observations in the
text, the tax argument seems unnecessary to support the proposition that home build-
ing and home purchase are more sensitive to changes in the cost of borrowing than
is business investment. Moreover, the tax argument is apt to open a pandora box of
fiscal recriminations as among different economic sectors. If a high tax rate is said
to favor corporations and other businesses in their ability to pay for external funds,
it can also be said that home purchasers (and therefore builders of homes for sale)
are favored over renters by income tax deduction for mortgage interest and real-estate
tax or by the exclusion, for income tax purposes, of imputed net income derived
from the investment in their home.
See, for example, ioth Annual Report, Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1956,
Table111-53, and similar tables in other annual reports.
Si Ibid.
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than in 1956anda somewhat smaller portion even than in 1955.32 The
disproportionate impact of tightening credit on the housing sector was felt
more acutely and immediately in the sharp decline in forward commitments
for the financing of future building than in the actual flow of funds. The
degree of disproportionate results of credit restraints seems to depend as
much on the duration of the restraints as on their severity.
The impediment of Noncom petitive interest Rates. Even though tighten-
ing conditions in financial markets have uneven effects throughout the eco-
nomic system, these may be considered an unavoidable by-product—a low
price to pay for the maintenance of general stability when economic re-
sources are strained. Is the impact on residential construction not only
disproportionate but also undesirable? Consideration of this question obvi-
ously involves value judgments. An affirmative answer rests generally on the
view that economic stabilization policy concerns itself with the composition
of output as well as with aggregate output, on the preferred position of
better housing as a national objective, and on the possibility that the resource
use associated with an unsustainable expansion of business investment would
push residential building below sustainable levels.
An affirmative answer in this particular case, however, can also be based
on the existence of a special and unintended impediment to the flow of funds
into the housing sector. This was the legislative ceiling of 4.5 per cent on
the interest rate for veterans' home loans, which became increasingly non-
competitive in 1956 and 1957.Theunattractive maximum rate resulted not
only in a sharp decline in housing starts and mortgage lending under the
V.A. program, but also contributed indirectly to diminishing activity under
the FHA program. For although the law provided ample discretionary
authority for raising the maximum interest rate on FHA loans, the adminis-
tration was reluctant to use this authority and, through such action, encour-
age shifts from V.A. to FHA lending and hasten the demise of the V.A.
program.83 Thus, the increase in the FHA rate was deferred until December
1956, a timing perhaps affected by political considerations as well as others.
The nearly simultaneous request of the administration that Congress raise
the ceiling on the interest rate for V.A. loans was rejected, and it was only
to the statement of uses and sources of funds prepared by the Life
Insurance Association, residential mortgages accounted forper cent of total funds
in 1955, 35 per cent in 1956, and 27 per cent in 1957. A similar movement is
evident from the statement prepared by the Bankers Trust Company of New York,
although the latter, because it employs different concepts of uses and sources of
funds, shows a different level of the ratios.
Different levels of maximum interest rates on FHA and V.A. home loans existed
during most of the 1945-1952 period, however, and a uniform rate was only adopted
in 1953. Since December 1956, of course, there have again been different levels of
maximum rates.
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in the Housing Act of April 1958thata small increase to 4.75 per cent was
granted. Meanwhile, new activity under the V.A. program came nearly to a
standstill.
As the V.A. home loan program went into a coma, more FNMA aid and
greater liberalization of FHA down payments were offered than would have
been otherwise required, in order to help offset the rapidly diminishing
activity under that program. This condition also explains, at least in part,
why executive actions were taken in 1956 and 1957thattended to increase
the demand for mortgage funds when the main difficulty was reduced
availability of funds. It is always tempting to attribute such actions to the
undeniable fact that "housing is politics," but this interpretation does not
do full justice to the particular circumstances of the time. The efforts to
cushion the impact of tightening credit on the housing sector represented
not so much interference with the market allocation of funds as an attempt
to help offset a legislative obstacle to the flow of funds into housing.
To what extent a more competitive interest rate on V.A. loans would
have attracted funds to residential construction and reduced the need for
support through FNMA and FHA remains a matter of speculation. In view
of the pressure on commercial bank reserves and the less favorable liquidity
position of financial institutions, a larger volume of residential mortgage
investment would have required, for the most part, the bidding of funds away
from other investment outlets. Such bidding would have raised the cost of
money to all borrowers, with small impact on the business demand for funds
which is relatively insensitive to changes in the cost of money. Also, the loss
of V.A. activity may iiave been partly offset by shifts to conventional
mortgage lending, including an increasing volume of junior financing.84
It is perhaps instructive, however, to compare the decline in housing starts
under the V.A. program with the decline in starts under the FHA program,
in which administrative adjustments of the interest rate were made, although
belatedly. Between 1955and1956, starts under both FHA and V.A. auspices
dropped at about the same rate, nearly one-third. Between 1956 and 1957,
however, starts under the V.A. program fell by 53 per cent while those under
the FHA program declined by only iipercent. If the relative decline in
starts under V.A. auspices in 1957hadbeen 33 per cent, still three times
as great as the drop in FHA about 53,000additionaldwelling units
84No comprehensive data are available on the use of junior mortgages during the
period under consideration. In the opinion of FHA and V.A. field officers, junior
financing increased in many areas. Cf. Second Mortgage Practices, Staff Report to
the Subcommittee on Housing of the House Banking and Currency Committee, 85th
Congress, First Session, December 2!,1957.
This conservativeillustrationisselectedto allow for the probably greater
volatility of production under the V.A. program irrespective of the maximum interest
rate on V.A. Joan!.
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would have been placed under construction, and total private starts would
have fallen short of the 1956 volume by only 48,000 units (Table i).Or,
alternatively, a more competitive interest rate on V.A. loans would have
obviated about of the support given to the market by the Federal
National Mortgage Association in 1957whenFNMA bought 87,000 loans.36
Conclusion
Among the measures acting on the supply of funds, the mortgage pur-
chases by FNMA unquestionably gave the market a substantial measure of
support. In the course of 1956 and 1957,theAssociation bought about $i.6
billion of FHA and V.A. loans in the secondary market; more than $1.2
billion of these were V.A. loans. Purchases were stepped up from $72 million
in the first quarter of 1956 to $388 million in the first quarter of 1957.
Although they declined thereafter, they still were more than $200 million
in the final quarter. When the relatively small acquisitions under the Asso-
ciation's other programs are included, the total during 1957 exceeded the
previous peak of FNMA's gross purchases in 1950.Likewise,when net pur-
chases (purchases minus sales of mortgages) are considered, the dollar
volume in 1957wasgreater than in any previous year, and the 1956 amount
approximated the earlier peak of 1949. Net purchases in FNMA's combined
operations exceeded $6oo million in 1956 and were nearly $i.ibillionin
1957, compared to the previous peak of $652 million in 1949 (Chart 5).
The impact of FNMA activity on the market can best be gauged by
reference to the volume of government-underwritten loans made during i 956
and 1957—the only kinds of loans eligible for purchase by the Association.
Its net purchases in all operations combined equaled about 7 per cent of the
amount of FHA and V.A. loans made during 1956 and as much as i8 per
cent of the total during 1957.Andthe impact on the V.A. home loan sector,
which felt the pinch in the private secondary mortgage market most, was
even greater. The net amount of veterans' home loans bought by FNMA
in 1956 equaled nearly 8 per cent of the total amount of V.A. loans made
during the year, and that percentage rose to more than 20percent in 1957
(Tables2 and ii).Theinfluence of FNMA purchases on the flow of FHA
and V.A. loans into new construction was still greater, for over 8o per cent
of all mortgages bought by the Association in 1956 and 1957weresecured for
homes less than two years old.37
Of course, not all of FNMA's purchases were necessarily net additions to
the supply of mortgage funds. In the absence of its support program, some
Report and Financial Statement of Secondary Mortgage Operations, Federal
National Mortgage Association, December 31,1957.
Semi-Annual Report, Federal National Mortgage Association, June 30,1956;
December31,1956;June 30,1957; andDecember 31,1957.
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ofthe loans bought by the Association would have found their way into the
private secondary market, though probably at lower prices than those paid
by FNMA. Also, the FNMA obligations issued to private investors in order
to finance its purchase program (Table i8) might have absorbed some of
the funds potentially available for mortgage investment, although most of
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these obligations were for short terms and, since the money and capital
markets are to some extent compartmentalized, did not compete directly for
the same funds. Even when reasonable allowance is made for these side
effects, the purchases of the Association, by supplementing the sharply decin-
84The Policy Reversal of 1956-1957
TABLE18
Outstanding Borrowings of the Federal National Mortgage Association,
• Combined Operations, 1948-1957
(dollars)
December 31From PublicFrom U.S. TreasuryFrom RFC
1948 — — 174,872,627
1949 — — 792,375,593a
1950 — 1,310,322,313 —
1951 — 1,813,221,115 —
1952 — 2,199,508,000 —
1953 — 2,375,000,000 —
1954 — 2,448,518,477 —
1955 570,374,000 2,001,781,341 —
1956 770,374,000 2,162,733,729 —
1957 2,687,435,000 958,679,722 —
SoultcE: Federal National Mortgage Association.
aIncludesaccrued interest on notes.
ing volume of private investment in FHA and V.A. loans, acted as a substan-
tial stabilizing force in the housing and mortgage markets.38
The administrative adjustments of the maximum interest rate on FHA
loans also helped to cushion the decline in the flow of funds into residential
building. In response to these actions, FHA housing starts recovered sub-
stantially in 1957, in spite of generally adverse financial conditions. During
the last quarter of 1957,startsunder the FHA program were nearly 30per
The role of FNMA's price schedule in supporting the mortgage market bears
further examination, which would lead too far afield in this essay. When funds be-
come less freely available, the Association can increase its market support by delaying
the adjustment of its prices to the decline of prices for FHA and V.A. loans in the
private secondary market. Under such conditions, FNMA may even lead rather than
follow the prices paid by private investors. The great imperfections of the secondary
mortgage market make it extremely difficult to determine current market prices.
Prices paid by private investors at any one, time vary a great deal, depending, among
other things, on geographic area, loan terms, and the quality of the underlying
security. Information on prices as well as the volume of transactions is sketchy since
most buyers and sellers are interested in clothing their transactions in a veil of
secrecy. There are elements of uniqueness in every "deal." Consequently, FNMA's
prices cannot be attuned to the market with any precision. This was recognized in
1956 by changing the legal requirement that FNMA buy "at the market price for
the particular class of mortgages involved" to the requirement that FNMA establish
its price schedule "within the range of market prices." No matter what the legal
formula may be, the structure of the market allows varying legitimate interpretations
of price changes. The Federal National Mortgage Association sets its purchase prices
by states or for groups of states. Within each state or region, prices vary depending
on loan terms.
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cent larger than in the corresponding period of 1956, while starts under the
V.A. program with its frozen interest rates were about two-thirds
Nevertheless, the measures of 1956-1957 did not prevent housing starts
under the government programs from declining since the sharp drop in V.A.
starts more than offset the recovery in FHA starts. Housing starts financed
with government-underwritten loans during 1957 were 35.5 per Cent less
than in i 956 and accounted for about 30 per cent of the total as against
42 per cent during the preceding year (Table i). Even so, it does not seem
far-fetched to attribute part of the recovery of total housing starts from
March to August 1957, when the number of dwelling units placed under
construction increased at an annual rate of i 23,000, to the combined effects
of the earlier stepping up of FNMA purchases of mortgage loans, the up-
ward adjustment in FHA maximum interest rates, and the liberalization of
FHA down-payment requirements. To be sure, this expansion in activity,
which was also accompanieda rise 'in conventionally financed starts,
proved' to be short-lived, but it did help moderate the decline in starts from
the 1956 level.
There remains the question of whether the credit relaxation and relief
offered through the governmental housing programs tended to blunt in any
appreciable measure the effectiveness of the general monetary and fiscal
restraints maintained until the fall of 1957. Such an effect may have been
associated directly with the increased borrowings of the Federal National
Mortgage Association, which in iand 1957 added nearly $i.i billion to
its indebtedness to the Treasury and private investors, and more indirectly
with the other actions to cushion the impact of tightening credit on the
housing sector. FNMA's demand for funds may have increased the over-all
pressures in financial markets, but its net effect on these pressures was
probably small in view of the increasingly limited elasticity in the supply
of funds in 1956 and 1957. More likely, the main result of the increased
FNMA borrowings was to bid funds away from other users and to raise the
level of interest rates. In terms of the use of real resources, the governmental
efforts to moderate the impact of tightening credit on the housing sector,
because of time lags, became effective largely in 1957. At that time, the over-
all demand pressures on resources were already beginning to subside and the
general business expansion was slowing down, giving way to a decline in the
fourth quarter of the year.
In view of both the timing and the limited magnitude of the relief actions
for housing, then, it is unlikely that they occasioned an appreciably greater
severity of the general credit restraints than would have been the case other-
wise, or that they caused the policy of restraint to fall far short of its objec-
tive. In fact, the moderate liberalization of governmental housing credit
Statistics, April T958,p.io.
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programs may have aided in maintaining restrictive monetary policy by
relieving the pressure for a change in over-all policy and by restraining
Congressional attempts to legislate an even greater measure of assistance to
the housing sector. Moreover, as was pointed out before, much of the support
to housing served only to offset in part the unintended depressing effects of
the premature inactivation of the veterans' home loan program by circum-
stances over which the executive branch of the government had no control.
Thus, far from writing "a prescription for benzedrine at a time when what
the state of the economy calls for is a tranquilizer," 40theliberalization of
housing credit merely counteracted an overdose of sedatives unintentionally
administered to the housing sector.
This conclusion, based as it is on the particular circumstances of the time,
does not gainsay the possibility that a multiplication of "protected" economic
sectors or of activities clothed with special public interest and supported by
federal credit programs may produce more severe limitations on monetary
policy in the future. If small business, capital spending by state and local
governments, and international loan programs as well as housing and farm
credit should be increasingly sheltered from the effects of general restraints,
restrictive monetary policies might be in danger of losing much of their force,
or such severity would be required that execution would become impossible.
Also, a growing volume of insured, guaranteed, or merely government-
sponsored long-term obligations issued under proliferating federal credit
programs might accentuate the already serious problems of managing the
federal debt. If the amount of such offerings should exceed by far the limited
demand of institutional and other investors for low-interest assets, the Treas-
ury would find it even more difficult to float its own long-term bonds, or
interest rates on both direct and indirect federal obligations would have to
be raised substantially. These observations emphasize the urgent need for
more systematic consideration of the role of federal credit programs gener-
ally in fiscal and economic stabilization policy.4'
"An Unwise Housing Policy," editorial in the New York Times, August 8, 1957.
41Cf.Economic Report of the President, January 1958, pp. 57-58.
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